Psicología Política en el Alcibiades I de Platón by Parra, José Daniel
Praxis Filosófica
Nueva serie, No. 31, julio-diciembre 2010: 7-16  ISSN: 0120-468825-44.
POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN PLATO´S ALCIBIADES I*†
Psicología Política en el Alcibiades I de Platón
José Daniel Parra
Universidad Externado de Colombia
ABSTRACT
The following essay presents a close reading of the Platonic dialogue 
Alcibiades I. In the text, Socrates is depicted as a young teacher approaching 
young Alcibiades, a future prominent and hubristic ruler of post-Periclean 
democratic Athens. In his propadeutic task, Socrates appeals to Alcibiades’ 
unlimited self-love in order to gain his confidence and attention, rousing 
his spirited ambition and keen intellect, trying to tempt him into becoming 
a philosopher. We explore the roots of Alcibiades’ character, his desire 
for primacy intermingled with his fear of failure. For motives that will be 
explored in this essay, the mayeutic education of Alcibiades towards the 
life of wisdom not only failed, but also had undesired political outcomes. 
Would a more powerful Socrates have been able to procure Alcibiades’ 
ultimate allegiance? The Alcibiades I sheds light on the roots and potential 
limitations of the study of Platonic political philosophy.
Key Words: Socratic mayeutics, classical political philosophy, government, 
thumos, dialectic. 
RESUMEN
Este ensayo propone una lectura del diálogo platónico Alcibíades I. En el 
texto, vemos a Sócrates como joven maestro aproximándose al también 
joven Alcibíades, quien sabemos se convertirá en un prominente y hubristico 
gobernante de la Atenas democrática post-Periclea. En su tarea propedéutica, 
Sócrates apela al amor propio ilimitado de Alcibíades con el fin de ganar su 
confianza y atención, incitando su espíritu de ambición y su agudo intelecto, 
tratando de tentarlo hacia la vida filosófica. En el texto exploramos las raíces 
* Recibido Marzo de 2010; aprobado Agosto de 2010.
† Este artículo es producto del proyecto Humanismo como Política, adscrito al Observatorio 
OPERA, del Centro de Investigaciones y Proyectos Especiales CIPE, Universidad Externado 
de Colombia. Fue originalmente uno de los capítulos de la investigación de maestría titulada 
Paideia: A Study of Socratic Teaching, realizada en la Universidad de Carleton, bajo la 
dirección de los profesores Waller R. Newell, Tom Darby, y el apoyo especial de Horst 
Hutter. El autor agradece a los profesores Juan Camilo Rodríguez, y Fernando Estrada 
Gallego por el apoyo institucional y académico que hizo posible la publicación del texto.
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del carácter de Alcibíades, su deseo de primacía enlazado con su temor 
al fracaso. La educación mayéutica de Alcibíades hacia la vida filosófica 
no sólo falló, sino que además tuvo indeseables consecuencias políticas. 
¿Habría sido un Sócrates más poderoso capaz de procurarse la lealtad última 
de Alcibíades? El Alcibíades I arroja luz sobre las raíces y limitaciones 
potenciales del estudio de la filosofía política platónica. 
Palabras Clave: Mayéutica socrática, filosofía política clásica, gobierno, 
thumos, dialéctica. 
1.  Introduction
The Alcibiades I1 is an attempt at a philosophical propadeutic2. It is 
an ad hoc conversation as it were, whereby the setting remains indistinct 
(presumably it is a private conversation: where it takes place we do 
not know). It is a performed dialogue: we are shown the actions of two 
fictionalized characters in the present tense, without the filter of a narrator. 
The dramatic date of the Alcibiades I occurs some seventeen years before 
the Symposium (416 BCE), and thus, the reader is left to wonder if by this 
time Socrates has already been initiated into the pedagogical mysteries of 
eros by the prophetess Diotima. Presumably he has. Nevertheless he still 
seems to be unseasoned in the erotic art of psychagoge3 or soul-shaping. 
We will take this into account as perhaps one of the limitations of his 
approach to Alcibiades at this point in time, and, arguably, as perhaps one 
of the reasons for his ultimate failure to steer Alcibiades’ longing away 
1 I have used the Loeb Classical Library edition of Plato’s Alcibiades I. Trans. W.R.M Lamb 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1964). Other references from the Corpus Platonicum are from 
The Complete Works of Plato, ed. John M. Cooper (Cambridge: Hackett, 1997). Citations 
are by Stephanus number.  References from Aristotle are from The Basic Works of Aristotle, 
ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001).
2 The Arabic medieval philosopher Al Farabi considered the Alcibiades I the gateway 
into the Platonic corpus. The dialogues were either read out-loud or performed for an 
audience of pupils (c.f. Aristotle Politics 1263b16, where reference is made to reactions 
to a Platonic dialogue by “listeners”) in the academy, the selection of dialogues taking 
place in accordance with the spiritual and intellectual development of school members. 
For an interesting discussion on the chronology and scholarly debate about the authenticity 
of the Alcibiades I, see Gary Alan Scott, Plato’s Socrates as Educator (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2000), pp 205-207. For further discussions about paideia in 
classical political philosophy see the work of Waller R. Newell Ruling Passion the Erotics 
of Statecraft in Platonic Political Philosophy. (Laham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000) with 
Catherine H. Zuckert Plato´s Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues. (Chicago: U 
Chicago P, 2009), pp. 229-237. Consider also the important work of Pierre Hadot What is 
Ancient Philosophy? Trans. Michael Chase. (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2002), especially 
pp. 149-157. A classical observation about the relation between the historical Socrates and 
young Alcibiades can be found in Xenophon Memorabilia I.2.39.
3 Plato Laws 650b6-9. 
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from his love of being praised by the demos towards the love of wisdom 
and the philosophical way of life. 
The action of the dialogue begins with Socrates praising Alcibiades’ 
beauty. Beauty functions as a catalyst for attention: it evokes awe (and 
attraction if we think the object of desire is attainable) and/or fear (if 
we expect rejection, especially on the basis of past failures). Many of 
Alcibiades’ suitors have felt attracted to the promising youth and yet have 
tended to become distant from him, intimidated by his keen spiritedness. 
Now he no longer has the pristine beauty of a child (pais), and is becoming 
a “grown up” (meirakion), a young man; presumably not only his beard has 
started to show, but also his voice is turning thicker, graver. Socrates had 
remained distant yet most attentive to the boy’s elementary education—
his daimonion  prevented him from approaching Alcibiades at such early 
stage (103a6)—but now he considers that it is the right moment (kairos) to 
explain him the reason why he feels his arrogant character (megalophónon, 
103b5) is too much for others to bare (104 a).
2.  Deconstructing Alcibiades: Pater and Patria 
Socrates offers to diagnose Alcibiades’ character. He possesses all the 
right qualities of the kaloi kagathoi, good birth, looks, stature, family 
connections, fortune. He is also the nephew and protegé of the great 
statesman Pericles, for Alcibiades’ father died when he was a child4. As 
in the case of other archetypal figures of outstanding young men such as, 
say, Telemachus (Homer, Odyssey III, 77-79, 370-377 and IV, 315-323, 
with 696-711), or Oedipus (Sophocles, Oedipus the King 307-315 and 
1511-1514) the premature loss or untimely withering of a father figure will 
eventually mark Alcibiades’ desire to vindicate his past. Thumotic men 
seem to be drawn to the political arena as therapy for the pain of some 
essential loss. Is the critical fate of their fathers awaiting them?—most 
likely, hence their need for power, friends, resources to turn-around and 
overcome these haunting omens5.  Surely they do not want to resemble their 
fathers in their mistakes or shortcomings: they both want and don’t want to 
live up to their father’s nature, which is also their own. The thumotic man 
is torn: angry for his father’s failings or unfulfilled expectations (this he 
conceives of as wrongs still unexpiated), and driven (for privation elicits 
4 Plutarch.  Lives. Dryden’s translation. Ed. and intro. Charles W. Elliot. (Danbury: Grolier, 
1980) pp. 106. According to C.D.C. Reeve’s introduction to Plato’s Republic (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1992), pp. viii, Plato’s father, Ariston, also died when Plato was still a boy, and his 
mother re-married Pyrilampes, a friend of Pericles. 
5 Political power presupposes but also reinforces friendships: “holders of public office can 
do many people a good turn” (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1188b15).
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pain, and in that condition a man is always aiming at something6) to live 
up to his own, and thus his fathers’, true nature7. Thus his passion of pride 
is fueled by anger rooted in fear of failure. Alcibiades is angry, but he is 
still too young to understand this8. He is not Callicles, who comes from a 
somewhat lower station in life and who is also older, more seasoned, and so 
more self-conscious about his political pretensions and fears9. Perhaps the 
eventual failure of Socrates to steer Alcibiades away from the temptation of 
tyranny has to do with Alcibiades’ deeply rooted feeling of indignation at 
even the possibility of not striving to perform great or noble deeds. Why? 
Because otherwise Alcibiades would have turned out soft: aristocrats who 
don’t have a sense of purpose tend to become effete (consider the problem 
with the sons of Pericles mentioned at 118e1-210). Also: in contrast to the 
poet Agathon, for instance, who is also beautiful and talented but dreamy 
and passive (Symposium 223d9-10), Alcibiades is hot-blooded (Aristotle, 
Rhetoric 1389 a25-30) a quality that induces him to daring action.  
Alcibiades, despite having all advantages that ordinary people seek, is 
not content with them (104 e-105 a). In the enumeration of Alcibiades’ 
qualities (104 a-b) Socrates failed to mention a crucial element, which will 
indeed be the fishhook through which he aspires to reach him: education. 
Education is not (yet) an object of Alcibiades’ pride. Can education make 
him more powerful?  Socrates tempts him: “suppose one of the gods asked 
you, ‘Alcibiades, would you rather live with what you now have, or would 
you rather die on the spot if you weren’t permitted to acquire anything 
greater?’ I think, you’d choose to die. What then is your real ambition 
in life? I’ll tell you” (105a5-8). Alcibiades craves universal, unequal 
recognition. How should Socrates deal with Alcibiades’ unlimited self-
love? Young Alcibiades is not fearful of death and his strengths, pride and 
eros, have directed his attention towards political action11. 
6  Ibíd., 1739 a10.
7 This psychological knot will be determinant for the political ambitions of the young 
Alcibiades (and thus for Athens), which perhaps the diagnostician Socrates failed to 
observe. C.f. Machiavelli Discoursi III, 17. 
8 Plutarch, Lives: “‘You bite Alcibiades, like a woman’, ‘no’, replied he, ‘like a lion’” (p. 
107).  See especially Nietzsche Gay Science, aphorism 9, with Zarathustra II, “On the 
Tarantulas”: “What was silent in the father speaks in the son; and often I found the son 
the unveiled secret of the father”. Consider also Hannah Arendt The Human Condition 
(Chicago: U Chicago P, 1998), pp. 9. 
9 I have attempted to provide a discussion on the psycho-political relation between Socrates 
and Callicles in my essay “The Rhetoric of Action: A Reflection on Plato´s Gorgias”. Praxis 
Filosófica, Nueva Serie, No. 28, Enero-Junio 2009, p. 55-75. 
10 In connection to this point see also Plato Laws 694c6-696a5.
11 Contrast Plato Phaedo 64a 2-4, with Xenophon Memorabilia I.2.16.
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Alcibiades is also a few days shy from addressing the Athenian assembly 
for the first time (105b1), aspiring to be honored even more than the great 
Athenian statesman Pericles12 (105b3). Can the political community 
accommodate the imposing ambitions of Alcibiades? Political praxis aims 
at containing thumos (fear and anger), channeling it in the direction of 
active civic virtue for the purposes of recognition in serving the common 
good. But Alcibiades’ spiritedness is also subordinated to love, to his 
desire for immortality, that is, to attain the good always. Can political life 
offer him this? Here the pedagogic dynamic of the dialogue presents a 
problem: the word philosophy is never mentioned in the Alcibiades I. Why 
is philosophy omitted? Plato hints that the future general-statesman will 
strive for transcendence (Symposium 208b3-7) through the life of action.
3.  Paideia and Empire
Why should Alcibiades associate with Socrates? Socrates starts to 
appeal to Alcibiades’ sensibilities by acknowledging him as a man (aner, 
104 e5). Alcibiades is about to enter public life. Not even the political 
ascendancy of Pericles seems to be enough to satisfy Alcibiades’ intent: 
Socrates inflames Alcibiades’ ambition to encompass world fame, the 
horizon of the Athenian polis being too narrow for his great expectations. 
Perhaps the failure of Socrates to mention philosophy in the dialogue 
is preliminary or strategic (he does not want to turn Alcibiades off), for 
it is a common misunderstanding to conceive philosophers as “odd” or 
useless for political purposes (Republic 487d-e). However this may be, 
Socratic mayeutics draws the need for philosophy not in a preventive but 
almost in a curative or homeopathic sense: knowledge of ignorance has to 
precede the desire to know. For why would one pursue what one already 
has? Socrates appeals to young Alcibiades using the political paradigm, 
but he universalizes it, claiming that his desire for glory can only be 
fulfilled by being recognized to the extent of great rulers of the stature of 
Cyrus or Xerxes. The constitutional limits of the Athenian polis seem to 
be too constraining for Alcibiades’ aspirations. Consistency should make 
Alcibiades strive to become emperor. 
We can see Socrates’ risky pedagogical method of bringing Alcibiades 
to a universal object of longing so that, presumably, after undergoing a 
purgation for the purposes of overcoming and elevating his political mania 
(which the Republic as a whole aims to achieve) he would then be in a 
psychologically open state which would make him self-conscious of his 
12 Thucydides describes Periclean Athens as “in principle, a democracy; in practice, rule by 
the first man (logoi men demokratia, ergoi de upo tou protou andros arché)”. History of the 
Peloponnesian War, (2.65.9).  
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radical ignorance, a necessary step prior to the sense of wonder that is the 
source of the desire to know. But what if Alcibiades is not willing to forgo 
doxa? Shadows are sirens. The love of true knowledge or wisdom, has to 
be preceded by an aporia or perplexity—Alcibiades has to know that he 
knows nothing, this pre-noetic experience has to grip him, before Socrates 
can turn his desire towards the love of knowing. For knowing that one does 
not know does not preclude the probability of further knowing. Knowing 
can only make sense if something can be known. The love of knowing 
tends to be abstract, meaning that its object(s) may not be tactile, but its 
origins are rooted in our common experience. The search for objective 
knowledge begins inter homines, that is, with political questions (105a-d). 
Socrates appeals to Alcibiades’ sensibilities—his pride and ambition—
with a political scenario that transcends the horizon of the polis.  As noted 
before, this is a dangerous proposition: Socrates attempts to have power 
over Alcibiades by expanding Alcibiades’ conception of his object of 
longing, from the local or particular to the universal. This, at a political 
level, he accomplished. What proved problematic was the further step to 
have Alcibiades move from the concrete (love of demos) to abstraction 
(love of philosophy) further to the elusive Idea of the Good that illuminates 
the Forms (Republic 518d9ff.), and then back to the polis—a full process 
without which the Socratic teaching, by the standards of the city, has 
seditious or at least impious implications13. 
Is the love of the demos possible after the awakening of the love of 
wisdom? How can these two “loves” learn from one another? How is 
thumotic love of the demos different from Socratic “philanthropy”? 
Is philosophic philanthropy possible? And if so, can (or should) it be 
political? Did Socrates succumb to the temptation of vying for Alcibiades’ 
love (105e-106a1) disclosing certain things perhaps unsuited for a young 
man of his temperament?14
4.  Paideia and War
The discussion has made Alcibiades curious, yet he still remains 
somewhat indifferent (106a-b). He is expecting Socrates, like every 
teacher, to moralize at him through long rhetorical speeches. But Socrates 
will not, for he values Alcibiades’ attention (106b1-4). Socrates (perhaps 
13 We should also note that excessive piety, or immoderate moderation can also be 
detrimental for the well-being of the political community, particularly at war, as the case of 
the Athenian general Nicias attests during the Sicilian expedition. Leo Strauss The City and 
Man (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1978), pp. 192-209
14 “The Master said: ‘Learning without thinking is useless. Thinking without learning is 
dangerous”. Confucius Analects book II, ch. 25.
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prematurely) conceives this is as a good moment to introduce Alcibiades 
into the dynamic of the elenchus. Socrates wants to teach Alcibiades to 
think, and so has crafted his approach to Alcibiades in the following way: 
first he will induce Alcibiades to assent to a statement; this statement will 
function as the starting point for further questions. These questions, in turn, 
will differ from the original proposition in that they will seem platitudes, 
usually requiring simple yes or no answers: they are not so much requests of 
information or detail as much as demands for an assent. Socrates will then 
“follow the logos” (Protagoras 333c) eventually leading to the affirmation 
or the contradiction of the original claim. Socrates is ironic in the sense that 
he pretends to be oblivious of the structure of the elenchus. After all, being 
refuted tends to make people ashamed or angry (think of Thrasymachus 
in Republic at 337a). The way in which Socrates presents his questions 
to Alcibiades seems to be somewhat contrived, unpolished: he questions 
him as he tries to tease him into learning to ask questions himself. We 
should also note that, according to the dramatic date of the dialogue 
(possibly 433 BCE) Alcibiades was about 19 years of age. Socrates would 
have been around 36 years old: perhaps at this point in time he was still 
an inexperienced dialectician and teacher of political philosophy (for he 
spent the first part of his career studying/teaching natural science). Young 
teachers tend to be imprudent. 
To come back to the text, at 106c Socrates questions Alcibiades with 
regards to his intention to advice the Athenian assembly: Alcibiades would 
be a good adviser only about matters of which he has attained knowledge. 
What he knows he either learned from others, or found about on his own 
(106d5-6). Actual learning presupposes an active desire to learn: it differs 
from habituation, training, or primary instruction in that for the most 
part these are imparted to us to form our character and disposition, as 
preparation for proper conduct and further development. Now, Alcibiades 
has received instruction in music and gymnastics and these are the subjects 
he has incorporated. Alcibiades is a high school graduate trying to run 
for public office, as it were. Will Alcibiades advice the Athenians on 
grammar, wrestling, or lyre playing? What if the Athenians are seeking 
advice on measures regarding, say, public health, should they listen to a 
precocious wealthy citizen, or to a doctor? As usual, Socrates contends 
that the standard for political counsel should be expertise in the matter in 
question (107c4-5). But what does the assembly deliberate about? This is 
a crucial point in the dialogue, which demonstrates Alcibiades’ familiarity 
with the objects of political passion: it is not any kind of political business 
but the most fundamental problem that draws Alcibiades’ attention—the 
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question of war. The regular management of government or routine matters 
of domestic policy is something Alcibiades is not really concerned about. 
Apparently Oikonomia does not agitate the passions, even if taking place 
at a large scale, the way questions of justice and war do.
5.  War and Justice
But then—how do we know whom or what is right to fight when and 
for how long? (107d3-4). The way a physician or medical expert is able to 
identify a sickness and knows that what is right is to attempt to re-establish 
health in the patient, the political expert must also know a standard of what 
is right regarding the problem of war. Although Alcibiades is no doctor he 
knows that it is better for a sick patient to get healthier—but he seems to 
be at a loss when it comes to knowing what is proper when advising the 
assembly on the issue of war (108e8-109a4). War is usually undertaken 
under grounds of having been cheated, robbed, or injured. Whom will 
Alcibiades advice the Athenians to wage war against—those who are 
treating them justly or unjustly? This is a key question: one can almost see 
Socrates and Alcibiades beginning to “go down to the Piraeus” (Republic 
327a1). But not so fast: Alcibiades is not Glaucon. Alcibiades knows (he has 
possibly overheard private conversations of Pericles with senior Athenian 
officials) that they are not dealing with a straightforward question (109c): 
“even if someone thought it was necessary [ananke] to wage war on people 
who were treating us justly, he wouldn’t admit it” (109c1-3). This would 
be unlawful (nominon) and improper, Socrates replies. Young Alcibiades 
agrees.  Alcibiades tells Socrates, hypothetically, that there may be wars 
caused by necessity which may override justice. If all just wars may be 
said to be necessary, it does not follow that all necessary wars are just. The 
rhetoric of war cannot be put forward in terms of necessity (109c8)—for 
that which we conceive as “right” or “better” when it comes to war-making 
means to be “more just”. Apparently (phainetai), replies Alcibiades. 
To continue: how did Alcibiades learn to make the distinction between 
the just and the unjust? Who taught him? Socrates says ironically that he 
would be the first to attend to such teacher, so that he could learn from 
him this politically most important distinction (109d). But can’t Alcibiades 
know about justice and injustice without a teacher? He certainly could, 
if he had searched, but this he would not do unless he was under the 
understanding that he did not already know its meaning (109e). There must 
have been a time when Alcibiades thought he did not know what justice is. 
But when? Even during Alcibiades’ boyhood Socrates saw him complain 
confidently against his playmates when he was being cheated (110b). Even 
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as a child Alcibiades knew when other boys where being unfair to him. 
Alcibiades swears by Zeus that he cannot tell when he first found out the 
meaning of justice (110c11)—but, upon reflection, he must have learned 
it the way everybody learns about these things: from the multitude (para 
ton pollon). Furthermore, didn’t he also learn to speak Greek from them? 
(111a1). Is language or grammar an object of deliberation? (c.f. Aristotle 
N.E. 1112a34-b11). The multitude is a competent teacher of Greek language 
because in that field it tends to be of one mind (homonoia). Is this the case 
with the question of justice? Are people of the same mind, or do they differ, 
when it comes to deciding and acting upon what is just and unjust? 
The passions tend to stir the people in different directions making 
them disagree with each other with regards to just and unjust men and 
their actions. Alcibiades must have seen the incessant quarrels about 
questions of justice, or if he hasn’t, at least he might have heard about 
them from other sources—particularly Homer (112 a-c). Alcibiades is 
familiar with the Illiad and the Odyssey: he acknowledges the authority 
of the poet. The people are not of a common mind about justice and this 
is depicted (and shaped?) by epic poetry. Alcibiades is not in a position 
to trust wholeheartedly the people’s judgment on this issue, and yet it 
was from the people that he came to know about it: he is perplexed. If 
Alcibiades did not learn from himself about justice, and if what he thinks 
he has learned from the people is found wanting, it seems that, after all, he 
might not know what justice is. This, Alcibiades thinks, is what Socrates 
is affirming (112e). Socrates corrects him: no, he has only limited himself 
to ask questions, all the conclusions Alcibiades has drawn for himself. But 
Alcibiades is not convinced (113c1). 
Alcibiades recollects about what actually takes place in the assembly: in 
practice, Athenians take the question of justice and injustice for granted—
what they really debate about is the advantageous in contrast to the non-
expedient. The assembly does not engage in political philosophy: they 
think justice is something obvious (113d2-3). They deliberate not about the 
true “what” of political questions, but about their “how” (which assumes 
a “what”). Socrates is undaunted: even if political discourse happens to 
be utilitarian or “realist” the same question remains: how do we know we 
are right? (113e). From whom did Alcibiades learn what is advantageous? 
Alcibiades notes that from the point of view of the assembly justice and 
expediency are not coeval. Socrates urges him, then, to try to persuade him 
of the truth of this proposition, through dialectical questions. Socrates makes 
Alcibiades aware of the fact that he does not possess Socrates’ power to ask 
questions. What is the difference between knowledge of asking questions 
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and the delivery of a discourse? At this point Socrates mélanges the two 
to force Alcibiades to think dialectically even though Alcibiades still has 
not realized the difference between dialectic and rhetoric15. Question me 
the way you would question the assembly—Socrates continues—if you 
can persuade me, you will have persuaded them: “is there any difference 
between an orator speaking to the people and an orator speaking in this sort 
of conversation, except in so far as the former persuades them all together 
while the latter persuades them one by one?” (114d) Of course there is a 
difference, as the distinction between the techniques of the philosopher 
Socrates and the rhetorician Thrasymachus attest. But on this point, 
Socrates remains silent. 
At this juncture in the dialogue Plato leaves the reader with the 
impression that Alcibiades is eager for an education in political science 
(politike). Is Socrates prepared to teach him statecraft? Shouldn’t Alcibiades 
become a philosopher first? But as noted before the word philosophy is not 
even mentioned in the text. What would this knowledge of political things 
amount to? Is it just a matter of habituation, and thus experience that can 
only come to him with time? And in that case why would Alcibiades need 
Socrates? Perhaps we should make a brief exploration about some essential 
features of statesmanship with the help of Aristotle’s analytical clarity, to 
get a sense of the art of political rule.
6.  Politike
Statesmanship or political science (politike episteme) is the practical 
science used by statesmen (politikos) in the business of ruling. It has an 
active rather than a purely theoretical character. Politike attempts to balance 
the understanding of universal standards (the epistemic grasp of first 
principles and the hierarchy of ends) with experience shaped by the ethical 
endoxa of a given political community (N.E.  1180ª32-1181b12). It is also 
a kind of craft (techne) in the sense that it aims at some good by means of 
distinct measures (dynamis), as does, say, medicine, or gymnastics. Ethics 
and compulsion are the fields of action of statesmanship; ethics aims to 
define the human good, happiness (eudaemonia), and to bring it about (NE 
1094a 22-24) not only at the level of the individual but also if possible, 
for the community at large. Human beings are political animals (Politics 
1253a5) and thus the ends which they aim at individually presuppose a 
political context with its advantages and limitations. The nature of human 
15 In connection to this distinction we are reminded of the case of Polus—a seasoned 
rhetorician who is also unaware of dialectical reasoning—in the Gorgias (461b4-462a6). 
See also Hegel Phenomenology of Spirit. Tras. A.V. Miller. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977), 
Preface, sections 57-58. 
po
li
ti
c
a
l 
ps
y
c
h
o
lo
G
y
 in
 pl
at
o
´s
 a
lc
ib
ia
d
Es
 i
35
beings is not fully developed, according to Aristotle, unless it is nurtured 
by ethical education (NE 1152 b1-8), which aims at self-overcoming or 
virtue (a sine qua non of happiness). Commendation however, may prove 
to be insufficient when dealing with the recalcitrant or vicious. Even the 
“virtuous” may not be so all the time. The statesman’s task in such cases 
is to restrain public offences by means of corrective treatment (kolazein) 
which aims at rehabilitation (N.E. 1119a33), or, in more severe cases to 
punish (timorein) or exact a penalty through lawful compulsion. Ethics is a 
praxis, an activity substantiated by praise and blame under the guidance of 
prudent judgement (phronesis). Ethical persuasion however seems to not 
be sufficient to make most human beings opt for virtue most of the time, 
hence the need of law. Statecraft aims at “making” people better (N.E. 
1179b-1180a), if necessary, by means of regulations and coercive measures. 
For Aristotle the art of governing is thus an amalgam of prudence and 
regulative procedures, a tension, between the activity of political freedom 
and the craft of political authority16. 
Politike is concerned with action, hence it deals with usual truths or 
probabilities (hos epi to polu). A usual truth is a judgement that is pertinent 
to most of the cases it is applied to, but not to all. Ethics is concerned 
with this realm of activity, and not with universals of no exception, such 
as necessity (ananke). So, what is necessity? In the Metaphysics (V, 5) 
Aristotle contends that it is a category of that which an entity requires 
for its self-preservation. Ananke entails what is compulsory or contrary to 
motive and purpose. It implies the set of conditions without which a given 
good would be of no avail. The compulsory is called necessary—thus the 
necessary is painful. Necessity is something that would not be subject to 
deliberate persuasion, it is contrary to the movement that accords with 
purpose and reasoning.  A necessity cannot be otherwise unless affected by 
a stronger necessary motion. 
Now, ethics on the other hand is concerned with the usual or open-
ended, and thus deliberation is an essential undertaking for this field of 
endeavour. While epistemic knowledge aims at understanding ananke, 
deliberation as the reasonable process aiming at a practical decision 
(prohairesis) results from the rational aim to attain some good. It is a 
desire to do something in the present moment, to act, following a rational 
calculation (logismos) or inference that has shown a course of action to 
be proper or required to achieve a given end (N.E. 1112b26; 1139a21-
b5). Prohairesis deals with particular cases (kath’ hekaston) that must be 
16 On this point I am indebted to W.R. Newell’s essay “Superlative Virtue: The Problem of 
Monarchy in Aristotle’s Politics”. Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 40, No.1 (Mar., 1987), 
pp. 159-178.
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judged by perception (aisthesis); actions are concerned with particulars, 
and perception is what makes us aware of these (NE 1109b20-3). We 
attain facts through perception, and prudence (phronesis, NE 1141b14-
22) rationally perceives from the facts whether they are permissible or 
commendable, harmful or dangerous. The principles of justice (dike) are 
only usual, lacking the exactness of science (episteme)—hence we debate 
about them—for otherwise they could not be concerned with human action 
but only with necessary behaviour or determined conduct. Hence the 
importance of self-knowledge and knowledge of human character types 
which combines knowledge of the distinct, the usual, and the necessary 
in man. Men should appeal to their deliberative capacity, their perception 
and their understanding (nous) to see what ethical principles apply to a 
given practical situation. This will be second nature to the phronetic man, 
because of his experience (empeiria), a key aid to prudence (NE 1141b18). 
The ability of ruling others presupposes self-rule.
7.  In Search of a Guide: Socrates or Pericles?
To come back to the text, at 116e we are shown that whereas Socrates 
keeps saying the same things on the same subjects, Alcibiades, when 
questioned, says first one thing, but then ends up contradicting himself. 
Alcibiades however, intends to be consistent. Socrates asks: “wouldn’t 
you say that whenever someone doesn’t know something his psyche will 
necessarily waver about it?” (117b2-3). We do not set to do something 
unless we think we know what we are doing, or else we let the expert do it. 
Otherwise we make mistakes and miss the mark (hamartámontes, 117e8-9). 
It is ignorance (agnoia) that causes truly undesired outcomes. Not-knowing 
(amathia) about the most important things like justice and the advantageous 
is most harmful. Is not Alcibiades wavering about these notions? And how 
can Alcibiades rush into politics in that state? It is true that he would not 
be alone in this condition for he would have most politicians for company. 
Perhaps one of the exceptions would be his guardian, the statesman Pericles 
(118c-2). Pericles has done his homework: he studied with Pythoclides and 
Anaxagoras, and even now, despite his old age, he consults with his music 
teacher, Damon. Can Pericles teach Alcibiades the art of politics? Socrates 
makes a distinction between understanding something and being able to 
teach someone what one represents. What is the difference between a craft 
(techne) and a knack (alogon pragma)? How is it possible that Pericles 
knows what he seems to know, and yet he has been incapable of teaching 
his sons, who have turned out simpletons (118e1-2)? Because for Socrates 
we know that someone understands something when he can demonstrate 
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that he has made someone else understand it. Now, Pericles is able to 
practice politike, but the fact that he has not been able to transmit this 
knowledge to his heirs would seem to indicate that he is not self-conscious 
about the procedures of his practice, unlike a true teacher. Pericles is also 
an unleisured man. Alcibiades should not be counting on learning the art of 
rule from him (118e4-6). Who could orient Alcibiades? Does he intend to 
remain in his present perplexed condition, or is he willing to practice self-
cultivation (epimeleian tina poieisthai)? 
Learning to rule others presupposes learning self-rule. If politics were 
only a matter of phronesis, then, naturally Alcibiades would have to undergo 
a process of apprenticeship (like most politicians do) to accumulate the 
experience necessary to learn to discern political phenomena by means of 
trial and error. And Alcibiades, given his outstanding nature, would very 
quickly surpass his political rivals (119b-c). This kind of consideration 
disappoints Socrates: he cannot admit mediocrity, that is, the willing 
acceptance of lived contradictions. Socrates focuses his soul-shaping 
strategy on Alcibiades´ thumos:  with whom should a high-spirited man 
(megalophrona) like Alcibiades compete against? Because being better 
than one’s inferiors is no reason for pride (119e5-6). Alcibiades should be 
thinking about a rivalry with the powerful leaders of other great states like 
Sparta, or even of empires, like Persia. This sounds like the truth (alethe 
légeis) to him.
8.  Alcibiades of Arabia
Being entangled in the political rivalries and deliberative minutiae 
of democratic politics would distract Alcibiades from becoming a truly 
magnificent ruler. He should compare himself not to his fellow citizens, 
but to the sovereign rulers of Athens’ enemy states. Local politics might 
not require great preparation but competition with foreign rulers, and 
war, can lead to lethal outcomes for the unprepared. Now Alcibiades is 
eager to learn and listen. We note in passing that he still thinks the Persian 
king and the Spartan generals are no different from any regular politician 
(120c2-4). But in any case, wouldn’t self-cultivation help him face these 
rivals? Could self-cultivation actually harm him? He doesn’t think so. Still, 
how long would this project of self-shaping take? For we also know that 
Socrates, who is also involved in this process of self-cultivation, seems 
to have no time left to deal publicly with political matters (Apology 23b). 
Can this process of self-knowledge lead Alcibiades away from his political 
ambitions? We can almost hear him pondering: would this self-cultivation 
make me like you, Socrates? Socrates appeals to Alcibiades’ prejudices—
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he comes from one of the most notorious families in Athens: those who are 
well born will turn out virtuous (gignesthai pros aretén, 120d9-10), only 
if properly educated. Young Alcibiades is amenable to shame into learning 
not for the desire to know, but out of pride and the love of victory. 
The Persian princes—Alcibiades’ true rivals—are brought up with a 
rigorous education; around age fourteen they are entrusted to four royal 
tutors (basileus paidagogous), selected for being the wisest, the most just, 
the most sound-minded, and the bravest. What does the Persian prince 
learn from them? Four teachers, each for a cardinal virtue. Why don’t the 
Persians have teachers that embody all the four virtues? Would Socrates be 
such a teacher? In any event, from the wise man (sophostatos) the Persian 
prince learns the worship of the gods, the Magian lore of Zoroaster and 
also the secrets that a king should know (122-a1-3). The most just man 
(dikaiótatos) teaches him to be truthful. The sound-minded (sophronestatos) 
tutor teaches him how not to be mastered by the pleasures, so he can be 
free, and self-ruled. The bravest one (andreiótatos) teaches the Persian 
prince to be fearless, because fear is slavery (122a3-8).  It is no different 
with the Spartan generals, who also undergo a thorough education, though 
perhaps one of the differences is that the Spartans are educated in a kind 
of austerity that contrasts starkly with the luxury and extravagance of the 
Persians. 
What is the distinction between this comprehensive education and what 
Alcibiades’ potential teacher Socrates has to offer him? And what about 
Alcibiades’ current tutor Zopyrus the Thrasyan, an old man selected for 
him by Pericles? Pericles cannot educate Alcibiades—but is he at least able 
to select for him a proper teacher? (cf. Machiavelli, Prince, XXII). Socrates 
offers to teach Alcibiades out of love (122b7-8). Is Alcibiades in a condition 
to compete with these foreign kings? Socrates can help him, not because 
he himself is in a position to compete with the great kings—Socrates is not 
Pericles, but unlike him, he thinks he is able to improve his pupil through 
intelligence (epimeteia) and skill (techne). Pericles cannot teach what he 
practices, while Socrates can teach what he could (so he seems to claim) 
but chooses not to practice. But Socrates is in a similar condition than 
Alcibiades: the difference is that Socrates’ guide or guardian is better and 
wiser than Pericles. What is Socrates’ guide? A god, he claims (124c6). 
Alcibiades tells him to please be serious: an appeal to god seems to be a 
way just to end reasoned discussion. The pedagogical intent of Socrates 
here is to use Alcibiades’ sense of consistency for the purposes of elevating 
his unlimited self-love towards the ultimate universal object of longing17. 
17  “It always is and neither comes to be nor passes away, neither waxes, nor wanes ... it is not 
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Can Alcibiades move one more step upwards in “Diotima’s ladder”? 
Can Socrates initiate Alcibiades into the mysteries of love? (Symposium 
210a1-5).  Socrates is taking the risk of expanding Alcibiades’ horizon to 
encompass the Whole, shaping his desire for immortality (to attain the good 
always), by shifting his unlimited self-love to unlimited love of the good, by 
means of true virtue (cf. Symposium 212a-b). Alcibiades however, refuses 
to believe in dualism (124d1). Socrates tries to change strategy. Young 
Alcibiades could become interested in political philosophy, but political 
theology or political theory are not of his taste. Alcibiades is a skeptic. 
But are there not degrees of skepticism? And if so under what standard do 
we reckon them? Now, Socrates contends that every human being needs 
to cultivate or shape himself, but this is the case especially for him and 
for Alcibiades. This is most important for the purposes of what noble men 
(oi andres oi agathoi) do, the taking care of vitally crucial things such as 
leading and ruling the citizens of Athens (124e). Socrates draws Alcibiades’ 
attention from spirited competition with foreign rulers (i.e. war), to a failed 
hint at an initiation into the love of (a) god or the good, to end back again 
with local Athenian politics. Because Alcibiades is keen on the notion that 
the highest activity he can perform is ruling18.  For the purposes of this 
matter (and as a precondition for successful foreign policy?), Alcibiades 
needs to learn the craft of political rule. From Alcibiades’ perspective,  if 
politics were only a contest for honours and recognition then perhaps he 
would not need an intensive intellectual preparation, but since honours are 
not the cause, but the possible result of sound political practice, he will 
have to learn politike, the skill and the knowledge (episteme) of how to rule 
over men (125d7-125e6). Does Alcibiades know the aim of statecraft? In 
the medical craft when health is present and disease absent, we can know 
that the practitioner has been successful. In the political craft when some 
type of civic friendship is present, and hatred and insurrection are absent 
from the city, then the practitioner can claim to be doing the right thing.
When each person does his own work right mutual friendship ensues 
(127b10-11). Political friendship or civic justice seems to be related to 
minding one’s own business. But is minding one’s own business equivalent 
anywhere in another thing, as in an animal, or in earth, or in heaven, or in anything else, but 
itself by itself, with itself, it is always in one form; and all the other beautiful things share in 
that, in such a way that when those others come to be or pass away, this does not become the 
least bit smaller or greater, nor suffer any change” (Plato Symposium 211a2-b6).
18 Plato, Laws 713e4-6.  See Mark Blitz “Plato’s Alcibiades I” Interpretation 22, No. 3 
(Spring 1995), pp. 339-358. For a complementary discussion pertaining Theages, a less 
gifted student than Alcibiades and his relation with Socrates consider Thomas L. Pangle 
“Socrates and the Problem of Political Science Education”. Political Theory, Vol. 13, No. 1 
(Feb., 1985), pp. 112-137, and Catherine Zuckert  Plato´s Philosophers, pp. 355-56.
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to performing one’s own art? Or is it to cultivate oneself? (128a1). We 
cultivate or shape our body through the art (techne) of gymnastics. Is 
our self composed fully by our tactile body? How difficult is it to know 
oneself (gnomai heauton)? Alcibiades responds: “sometimes I think, 
Socrates, that anyone can do it, but then sometimes I think it’s extremely 
difficult” (129a5-6). Does Alcibiades know himself? Does Socrates? Does 
Alcibiades know that he must strive for self-knowledge, given that the 
unexamined life is not worth living? Socrates claims that if they know 
themselves they will be better able to know how to form and enhance 
themselves. At this point in the dialogue Socrates extricates the soul from 
the body for the heuristic purpose of directing Alcibiades’ attention to the 
formation and shaping of his psyche. The seeming dualism at this juncture 
aims at clearly delineating the sources of the self (130a8-11), in order to 
structure a physio-psychological hierarchy, so as try to crystallise in the 
young Alcibiades a center of striving distinct from the anxieties of the ego. 
Self-knowledge here would be a kind of soul-care as soul-craft for the 
purposes of clear-sighted and sound-minded action (131b4). It is still an 
open question whether Alcibiades, even at his point of his life, is truly 
convinced of the necessity of this askesis. For didn’t Socrates also induce 
him to seek to rule universally? And if he is in a position to do so, and 
thus aim at attaining immortal political glory, why shouldn’t he thoroughly 
focus on such promethean goal? What if the active nature of Alcibiades is 
unsuited for the pedagogical and contemplative life of never-ending self-
examination? 
Socrates tells Alcibiades that he is his true lover (erastes, 131e9; 
Republic 490a-b). He fears that Alcibiades’ self-love will drive him to 
seek the love of the demos, that is, to aim at being acclaimed by them. 
This is not in itself bad, but it is essential that Alcibiades prepare himself 
before hand, Socratic education being the pharmakon (132b2) or antidote 
against the danger of populism and misguided rule. Alcibiades should 
strive to know and account for his true self first, that is, his psyche, and 
the highest part within it, which reflects the divine (theoi, 133c4), for 
“someone who looked at it and grasped everything divine—vision (thean) 
and intelligence (phronein)—would have the best grasp of himself as well” 
(133c4-6). But for this process introspection is not enough: the way to 
self-knowledge entails a mirroring—looking into the soul of another, into 
the most divine element thereof, expressed in that person’s way of life. 
Socrates claims that self-knowledge is the same as being sound-minded 
(sophrosynen einai). Alcibiades senses Socrates is mixing certain possible 
truths with moralism. And again: why virtue? Courage and intelligence are 
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clearly necessary to rule, but does someone with the political ambitions of 
Alcibiades need justice and sophrosyne beyond appearing to have them for 
public convenience?
10.  Plato´s Laws: An Excursus in the Quest for Civic Virtue
To further explore the psycho-political conundrum of Alcibiades’ quest 
for self-knowledge as a prerequisite for statecraft, it might be useful to 
approach the discussion on civic virtue depicted in Plato’s Laws19. In book 
I the Cretan Kleinias contends that since an “endless war exists against 
all cities” (625e), civic education must consist in training citizens for 
courage, given that “nothing is really beneficial, neither possessions nor 
customs, unless one triumphs in war . . . for all the good things of the 
defeated belong to the victors” (626b). The Athenian Stranger addresses 
Kleinias’ argument by saying that indeed conflict is a fact of the nature of 
things, but this is true not only for nations, but also for individuals among, 
and within themselves. Given that the “harshest of all wars . . . is civil 
war” (629d), the greatest virtue, as Theognis asserts, is “trustworthiness 
in the midst of dangers” which is the result of “justice and moderation and 
prudence, existing in a man along with courage . . . for a man would never 
become trustworthy and sound in the midst of civil wars if he didn’t have 
the whole of virtue” (630b). Thus, in the account of the Laws the cardinal 
virtues conform a union in multiplicity as the quality of trustworthiness 
irrespective of positive law.
The virtue of courage (Andreia) is the foundation of action. It is an 
unnatural virtue—built upon a person’s natural spiritedness—first instilled 
through habituation, whereby the sub-rational nature of the young child’s 
psyche is conditioned by means of praise and blame in order to forgo 
immediate fears, for the purposes of a long-term goal (791c). Courage 
however, in order to be noble and avoid rashness, has to be complemented 
(630b): character education also requires a sense of inner measure 
(sophrosyne), which allows the person to balance his own appetites, his 
impulses, on the basis of self-knowledge. Because of its passive qualities 
Sophrosyne in itself tends to be inactive and too limiting (696d4-e2) and 
therefore has to be complemented by courage. Education in gymnastics, 
by means of singing, dancing, chanting is key in fostering andreia and 
sophrosyne, generating a sense of inner accord and harmony, induced from 
the outside in the child’s sub-rational part of the soul. 
19 For this section of the essay I have used The Laws of Plato. Translated, with Notes and an 
Interpretative Essay by Thomas L. Pangle. (Chicago: U Chicago P, 1988).  
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The virtues pertinent to the sub-rational part of the soul require 
further cultivation toward civic purposes in order to be beneficial for the 
public good. Once the youth reaches the age of reason, courage is further 
developed by means of praise and blame, and fear of the laws. Sophrosyne 
is an inner reflection of justice: its attributes of self-control, harmony, 
moderation and self-knowledge, which are pertinent to a person’s appetites 
and his personal benefit, can be expanded to take into consideration the 
good of others. Sophrosyne harmonizes the soul, protecting it from inner 
war; justice (giving to each their due) attempts to befriend individuals 
within a political community, protecting it from civil and international 
conflict (629 c). Self-friendship, and not only a friend-enemy distinction à 
la Carl Schmitt20, is the basis of self-identity and civic friendship (consider 
Republic 423e-24a). 
Given that the discussion of the virtues in the Laws is being phrased 
against the backdrop of war (international, civic, inner) the highest form of 
virtue, instead of wisdom (Republic 427e), becomes prudence. Phronesis 
is a political virtue. It comprises a sense of practical reason, an insight 
of existential possibilities for acting in a given situation. It is a quality 
of the rational part of the psyche that presupposes a correct ordering of 
the appetites (it needs courage to assert itself, and soundmindedness to 
know how to keep measure), in order to make possible good judgment and 
insight for the right moment of action (kairos). 
The multiplicity of civic virtues unified under a single virtue makes 
sense understood in terms of an educational process that has to address 
first andreia and sophrosyne by pedagogical means at early age, so as to 
create, induce, foster the right habits, which then become the basis upon 
which the rational parts of virtue—justice and prudence—are instilled and 
developed in men and women who already have a cultivated disposition 
toward the noble, the beneficial, and the beautiful. The unity of the 
civic virtues is paralleled with the three aims of legislation expressed 
in the Laws: freedom, friendship, reason (701d). Only citizens who are 
harmonious within themselves are able to befriend others, and it is this 
aim of civic friendship which allows the community not only to avoid the 
greatest evil—civil war—but to be willing and able to affirm its freedoms 
from ever-recurring disruptions domestically and internationally. In this 
platonic account of practical constitutional politics, reason (phronesis) is 
the prudence that guides legislators to foster and institute the laws that 
make freedom and friendship possible.
20 Carl Schmitt The Concept of the Political . Trans. and Introduction George Schwab, with 
a Foreword by Tracy B. Strong. (Chicago: U Chicago P, 1996). 
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 11.  A Future Statesman: Power or Virtue?
If Alcibiades does not know himself he cannot know what belongs 
to himself: he cannot know his due. If he cannot know what belongs to 
himself, he also couldn’t know what belongs to the city (133e8-9). In that 
condition, can Alcibiades be a true statesman? Wouldn’t Alcibiades be 
bound to make mistakes (hamartesétai) both private and public? Socrates 
appeals to Alcibiades’ soft spot: his fear of failure. Alcibiades has to be 
soundminded to be a good steerer of the ship of state (134b-c), and for 
this it is essential that he impart virtue to the citizens. And the best way 
to do so—by example (in addition consider also Machiavelli Prince chs. 
IX and XII). At this point Socrates pushes the argument too far telling 
Alcibiades that what he needs to become a statesman is not really political 
power nor authority, but justice and self-control. But Alcibiades senses the 
distinct quality of power (134c9-19). Now, is power sufficient for correct 
rule even if intelligence (nous) is lacking (134e)? Even the most powerful 
ship is bound to sink if its captain lacks insight and the skill of navigation. 
Likewise, according to Socrates, a ruler “by necessity” (ananke) needs 
virtue (arete) to guide the ship of state. So the power Alcibiades needs is 
arete. But before he has a better grasp of virtue, he should learn to rule by 
being ruled by somebody else. Is Socrates willing to become Alcibiades’ 
teacher? Alcibiades claims that from now on, he will be his constant 
companion (paidagogein). Socrates believes him, but he is hesitant: what 
he distrusts is not Alcibiades’ nature, but the city’s power, its luring song, 
which, he foresees, might get the better of them both.
12.  Conclusion
The purpose of this essay has been to discuss Socratic philosophical 
paideia in the Platonic dialogue Alcibiades I. The aim was to depict and 
analyze a Platonic illustration whereby young Socrates performs the 
role of political educator. The dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades 
shows a conversation at leisure (schoole) dedicated to initiate a young 
man into a philosophical practice of self-examination and self-shaping. 
Initial perplexity is awakened by Socratic questioning which, in principle, 
aims at bringing about a quest for self-knowledge, a process involving 
both potential discovery and transformation. As we saw in the paper 
however, Socrates’ initial encounter with Alcibiades was entangled with 
many reservations the young aristocratic Athenian had with regards to 
dedicating himself to the examined, contemplative life. The dialogue ends 
with a willingness on the part of Alcibiades to learn the art of self-rule 
from Socrates for the instrumental intent of becoming a statesman.  Even 
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young Socrates was conscientious of the fact that the different characters 
of his interlocutors ought to inform the way he approaches them (Phaedrus 
248d-c1), and therefore, his conversation with young Alcibiades aimed to 
appeal to his spirited nature and self-love, suggesting a further maturation 
towards the life of the love of wisdom. 
One of the key themes we explored was the dynamic between Socratic 
psycho-political education and his conviction that ruling should be the 
manifestation of statecraft. In this dialogue, Socrates approaches young 
Alcibiades with the intention of shaping his politics in the direction 
of civic virtue (arete) through character formation and clear-sighted 
understanding21. Self-knowledge is inextricably linked with cognizance of 
other natural human types. Furthermore, the theme of eros is constantly 
alluded to in Socrates’ philosophical rhetoric as a means to tap into his 
interlocutor’s source of striving. Philosophical paideia is a love story: the 
pull is a noble quest. Now, what are the motives preventing the love of 
wisdom from taking root in a spirited young man? Should a potential ruler 
become a philosopher first? And if not the lover of wisdom, who should 
rule?  The Alcibiades I is a Platonic dialogue trying to depict the first steps in 
Socratic education, its beautiful prospects as well as its human limitations. 
The relation between Socrates and Alcibiades remains the psycho-political 
root for the study of Platonic political philosophy. 
21 Leo Strauss, The City and Man, pp. 2-3.
